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I.     THE CONUNDRUM 
Customers discriminate, by race and gender, in every step of a market 
transaction. They discriminate in deciding with whom to do business. In one 
year-long experimental study, online advertisements for iPods showing the 
device in a black hand received 13% fewer responses and led to 17% fewer 
offers than the advertisements showing the device in a white hand.1 The same 
study also found that online buyers trust black sellers less than white sellers. 
Buyers were 17% less likely to include their name in e-mails to black sellers, 
44% less likely to accept delivery by mail, and 56% more likely to express 
concern about making a long-distance payment.2 
Customers also discriminate in how much they are willing to pay. An 
experimental study with baseball cards showed that, on average, a card in a 
black hand sold for 20% less than the same card in a white hand.3 Another 
study, based on the pictures and rental information of all New York City 
property owners seeking to rent their property on Airbnb, revealed that 
Airbnb guests are willing to pay non-black hosts approximately 12% more 
than black hosts for comparable properties,4 and exact a larger price penalty 
from black hosts for having a poor location.5 Discrimination by customers is 
well documented when it comes to tipping. A study of over 1000 taxicab trips 
in New Haven, Connecticut, found that customers tip black cab drivers 
approximately one-third less than white cab drivers, and that black drivers are 
 
 1.  See generally Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market 
Outcomes (Jan. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615149.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See generally Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on eBay, 4 RAND. J. ECON. 891 (2011); see also Clark 
Nardinelli & Curtis Simon, Customer Racial Discrimination in the Market for Memorabilia: The Case of Baseball, 
105 Q.J. ECON. 575, 578 (1990) (examining why collectible cards featuring prominent African-
American baseball players were valued far below cards featuring white players).  
 4.  See Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com 9 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377353.  
 5.  Id. at 3. Follow-on research showed that Airbnb guests with distinctively black names 
are roughly 16% less likely to be accepted by hosts than identical guests with white names. See 
Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment 11–12 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 16-
069, 2016), http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-2015-12-
09.pdf; see also Michael Todisco, Share and Share Alike? Considering Racial Discrimination in the 
Nascent Room-Sharing Economy, 67 STAN. L.R. ONLINE 121, 122–23 (2015) (exploring issue of 
racial discrimination in room-sharing economy); Audie Cornish, When Personalization Leads to 
Discrimination On Airbnb, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 26, 2016, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475773261/when-personalization-leads-to-discrimination-
on-airbnb. For the point that hosts and guests who use sharing platforms like Airbnb are all 
customers, see infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
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80% more likely to be stiffed.6 Studies of restaurant tipping show similar bias 
against female servers.7 
Customers discriminate, as well, in how they evaluate those with whom 
they do business. The marketing company WordStream analyzed 300 
responses from the company’s clients to a request to rate their level of 
satisfaction with client service representatives. Overall, clients undervalued 
female marketers by 21%.8 This pattern of discrimination is similar to what is 
observed when students rate their professors on teaching evaluations.9 
Current law does little to address discrimination by customers, even 
though it disproportionately hurts women and persons of color. Federal and 
state anti-discrimination laws prohibit firms10 of a certain size from 
discriminating against employees and customers on the basis of race, gender, 
and other characteristics.11 Firms may not decide to hire, or serve, only whites. 
Yet the law does not prohibit discrimination by customers.12 White diners may 
 
 6.  See Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 
1613, 1616 (2005).  
 7.  See, e.g., Matthew Parrett, Customer Discrimination in Restaurants: Dining Frequency Matters, 
32, J. LAB. RES. 87, 100–03 (2011) (concluding, based on data collected outside five Virginia 
restaurants, that customers tip female servers less than men, unless their customers are regular 
patrons or the service quality is exceptional).  
 8.  See Female Client Service Reps Get Lower Scores Despite Better Performance and Experience, 
THINKPROGRESS (May 22, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/female-client-service-reps-get-lower-
scores-despite-better-performance-and-experience-dfa457062f5c#.ydju1f46m. 
 9.  See generally Sylvia R. Lazos, Are Student Evaluations Holding Back Women and Minorities?: The 
Perils of “Doing” Gender and Race in the Classroom, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF 
RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA 164 (Gabriella Gutierrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012); Lillian 
MacNell et al., What’s in a Name: Exposing Gender Bias in Student Ratings of Teachers, 40 INNOVATIVE 
HIGHER EDUC. 291 (2015); William Arthur Wines & Terence J. Lau, Observations on the Folly of Using 
Student Evaluations of College Teaching for Faculty Evaluations, Pay, and Retention Decisions and Its Implications 
for Academic Freedom, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2006). 
 10.  We use the term “firm” to refer loosely to groups of individuals operating as a collective 
enterprise—usually, but not always, economic—to achieve particular goals. We use the term in this 
Article interchangeably with company, entity, business and, in some cases, educational institutions.  
 11.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by employers with 15 
or more employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2012). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in “any inn, motel, 
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) 
(2012). The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2012). Examples of state public 
accommodations laws include CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b) (West Supp. 2016); and N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 10:5-4 (West 2013). 
 12.  The exceptions are section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits race 
discrimination in private contracts, and section 1982 of the same Act, which prohibits race 
discrimination in property transactions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012). These statutes apply only 
to race discrimination, however, and have not been applied, in practice, against individual 
customers. The few cases brought against corporate customers have been easily defended, usually 
because of an inability to show discriminatory intent. See, e.g., TRI, Inc. v. Boise Cascade Office 
Prods., 315 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing on the basis of nondiscriminatory reason 
for defendant refusing to deal with plaintiff); Arduini v. NYNEX, 129 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 
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frequent one café over another because they feel more comfortable with its 
white clientele. Clients may refuse to hire a female lawyer to represent them 
because they believe men are more competent. Customers may avoid doing 
business with a gay photographer because they are disgusted by 
homosexuality. They may move to another line at a car-rental counter to steer 
clear of a service representative wearing a Sikh turban because they assume 
all foreign-looking people are terrorists. They may tip white male waiters more 
than black female ones because they believe men are, and should be, the 
family breadwinners. Current law barely even applies to firms when they act 
as customers; while in the customer role, they, too, may bring their race and 
gender biases to bear on with whom they select to do business.13 
It is a puzzle why we generally take for granted the right of customers to 
discriminate when they exercise their buying power. When society deems 
other market behaviors harmful enough, it customarily regulates both the 
supply and the demand side of the transaction. For example, both the sale of 
certain drugs and their possession are criminal.14 Prostitution laws make both 
selling and buying sex illegal.15 It is also illegal to both buy and sell body 
organs,16 as well as to offer and accept bribes.17 
Why, then, do we consider discrimination unacceptable when engaged 
in by firms but allow it on the part of customers? There would be practical 
problems with a law aimed directly at customers, of course—problems in 
monitoring customer behavior, determining what behaviors are 
 
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing for lack of allegation of racial motivation); Pippen v. Scales, 822 F. 
Supp. 305, 311 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (dismissing a claim under section 1981 for failing to allege 
discriminatory intent). For an exploration of the use of section 1981 by customers when they are 
discriminated against by firms, see generally Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. 1981 
to Claims of Consumer Discrimination (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 651, 2005), 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/651. For some of the difficulties involved in proving a 
section 1981 claim, see IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE 
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 127–36 (2001). For a discussion of the application of section 1982 
to home seekers, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2762026. What the 
ineffectiveness of these sections might tell us about the efficacy of a prohibition against 
discrimination directly against customers is explored further infra, Part IV.A. 
 13.  Although, theoretically at least, firms may open themselves up to a section 1981 or 
section 1982 challenge if they refuse to buy from a business on account of race. See supra note 12 
and accompanying text. 
 14.  Although selling, quite often determined by the amount in possession, is typically 
considered more serious than buying. For a chart of federal drug possession and trafficking 
penalties, see Federal Trafficking Penalties, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, https://www.dea.gov/ 
druginfo/ftp3.shtml (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
 15.  Traditionally, prostitution laws were aimed primarily against the prostitutes. See Sylvia A. Law, 
Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000). Led by Sweden, Norway 
and Canada, there is some movement in the law today toward penalizing only the customer side of the 
transaction. For a discussion of the Swedish law, see Max Waltman, Prohibiting Sex Purchasing and Ending 
Trafficking: The Swedish Prostitution Law, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 133 (2011). 
 16.  See National Organ Transplant Act § 301, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339, 2346 (1984). 
 17.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)–(c) (2012).  
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discriminatory, and proving a case of discrimination. As we later discuss in 
detail,18 these problems may be reason enough to steer away from a direct 
prohibition of discrimination by customers. Yet if discrimination by customers 
is a problem society wants to address, there are other approaches to consider. 
This article is the first academic work to address in detail whether there 
should be a public policy against customer discrimination and, if so, what legal 
approach makes the most sense.19 
In Part II, we explore two significant explanations for why society might 
choose to ignore discrimination by customers. The first one is efficacy. Society 
may regulate firms (especially big firms) but not customers because it believes 
that the regulation of firms alone is sufficient to achieve society’s non-
discrimination goals. The second explanation is a concern for personal 
autonomy and privacy. Society may regulate firms and not customers because 
it believes that limiting customer choice would infringe on the basic liberty 
interests of its citizens in ways not present in the regulation of firms. The 
concern with such potential infringement is not only that it potentially violates 
strong constitutional values, but also that legal coercion in the face of strong 
resistance to it may generate the kind of resentment that is counterproductive 
to the deeper improvements in attitudes that are necessary to reduce 
prejudice. 
We conclude that while these two rationales might sensibly inform what 
legal approach to discrimination by customers is best, they do not justify 
ignoring this discrimination altogether. The efficacy rationale explains why 
regulating at the firm level may be more effective than regulating the behavior 
of individual customers, but not whether a regulatory scheme aimed 
exclusively at businesses is sufficient or optimal. The privacy rationale offers a 
more powerful justification for focusing on firms rather than on customers, 
but again does not justify the absence of any policy whatsoever for reducing 
discrimination by customers. 
A policy against discrimination by customers would not mean necessarily 
treating all forms of discrimination the same. There are differences in the 
kinds of harms discrimination by customers impose, as well as in the relative 
benefits and burdens of strategies to reduce those harms. How society should 
approach discrimination by customers depends upon these differences. 
Although lines are hard to draw, in Part III we make an effort to distinguish 
between types of discrimination that are acceptable, perhaps even desirable; 
types that should be allowed, even if they have some potential for harm; and 
types that are harmful enough, and not justified by other factors, to warrant 
societal intervention. 
 
 18.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 19.  A new article by Lee Anne Fennell addresses discrimination by home seekers in the fair 
housing context. See generally Fennell, supra note 12. Another work to note the lack of symmetry in non-
discrimination obligations is Tarunabh Khaitan, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 199–200 (2015).  
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Taking into account these differences, in Part IV, we sketch out a 
plausible policy approach. We conclude that a direct ban on discrimination 
by customers would be ineffective, and likely counterproductive. Instead, we 
advocate intervention directed at those upon whom the law already imposes 
statutory non-discrimination obligations—i.e. firms of a certain size. The 
proposal imposes a duty on these actors to refrain from facilitating harmful 
discrimination by their customers and, in some cases, to structure customer 
choices in order to diminish the effects of their discriminatory biases. This 
Part explains the difference this proposal might make, and explores the 
multiple strategies it might encourage firms to adopt. 
We note that the matter of discrimination by customers is of growing 
importance as traditional boundaries within the economy are breaking down. 
Current law assumes a bifurcated market composed of firms who sell and 
individuals who buy; it regulates the former and not the latter. But firms in 
the new sharing economy—the Lending Clubs, Ubers, Airbnbs and Amazons 
of the world—operate not as sellers in the usual sense, but as coordinators of 
buyers and sellers. The sellers on these platforms are often individuals who 
seek to profit from their excess capacity, not corporate entities who produce 
goods and services to sell. Although expectations to complete a transaction in 
this sharing economy are also sometimes higher on sellers than on buyers,20 
the actual buy–sell transaction online is between parties who are both 
customers of the platform, and thus beyond the scope of current anti-
discrimination rules.21 This challenge to traditional transactional boundaries 
makes reconsideration of the law’s approach to customers especially timely. 
II.     THE RATIONALES FOR REGULATING ONLY FIRMS 
In this section, we explore the two most powerful reasons why society 
regulates discrimination by firms but not by customers: efficacy and privacy. 
A. EFFICACY 
1. The Efficacy Rationale 
One explanation for why we prohibit discrimination by firms and not by 
customers is that firms are easier to regulate. They are readily identifiable; 
they are already subject to many state obligations and regulations in exchange 
 
 20.  See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Why Aren’t There More Female Uber and Lyft Drivers?, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyft-drivers (explaining that Uber 
does not allow drivers to block a certain passenger and does not remove passengers with low ratings, 
but drivers with low ratings are let go).  
 21.  The unique features of the sharing economy raise issues for other areas of local, state, 
and federal law as well, including health and safety rules, product liability rules, landlord–tenant 
law, zoning restrictions, tax laws, and labor laws. For an analysis of these and other areas, see 
generally Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067 (2015). 
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for the privilege of doing business in the state; and they have owners and 
managers who can be held accountable. 
Firms are typically the cheapest cost avoiders. They participate in the 
market as a single player with control over how their employees are hired, 
promoted, and fired, and how their goods and services are produced and sold. 
Policies and procedures of the firm operate on a scale that individual 
consumer decisions do not. This feature not only gives firms more leverage 
than individual customers have; it also enables them to absorb the costs of 
ending discrimination more efficiently. To the extent that there are costs in 
refraining from discrimination—including the potential loss of revenues from 
bigoted customers—anti-discrimination mandates focused on firms tend to 
spread that loss throughout the industry in which the firms participate; 
without such spreading, firms choosing not to discriminate might be 
competitively disadvantaged.22 
Another factor that makes firms the more efficient site of anti-
discrimination obligations is that they are driven largely by profits, and thus 
already have an incentive to identify and eliminate potential inefficiencies 
within their organizations, including discrimination.23 In turn, eliminating 
their own discriminatory practices is likely to reduce opportunities for 
customers to discriminate. If businesses do not discriminate in their hiring 
and service practices, customers who do not want to sit at a lunch counter with 
blacks will have fewer places to dine out; airline passengers who prefer only 
female flight attendants will not have that choice if they want to fly; white 
customers who don’t want to shop alongside black customers will find their 
shopping choices narrowed. When customers have no choice but to deal with 
businesses with more diverse workforces, the resulting exposure to women 
and minorities may also tend to reduce customer biases toward these groups, 
thus altering the preferences that drive customer discrimination.24 
 
 22.  That the law reflects some assessment of the capacity of businesses to bear the burden 
of anti-discrimination is apparent in the fact that small businesses do not have the same anti-
discrimination obligations as larger ones. Only companies with 15 or more employees are subject 
to the anti-discrimination prohibitions of Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 
See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (2012). The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which requires up 
to a three-month leave for the case of a new infant or ill family member, only applies to companies 
who employ more than 50 employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2012). Likewise, businesses 
that are small enough sometimes are exempt from public accommodation laws. See infra text 
accompanying notes 66–69. 
 23.  On the ability of “large, sophisticated firms” to “detect and root out internal legal 
violations—and otherwise alter employees’ and contractors’ behavior—more easily than public 
authorities or outside private attorneys,” see Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. DIALOGUE 85, 90 (2015). 
 24.  For example, after courts disallowed airlines hiring only female flight attendants and 
imposing unreasonable appearance and weight restrictions on them, the traveling public soon 
got used to, and came to expect, male as well as female flight attendants, and even female flight 
attendants who did not conform to traditional criteria for female attractiveness. See Diaz v. Pan 
Am World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 
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2. Efficacy Limitations on Regulating Only Discrimination by Firms 
If we had to choose who to regulate—firms or customers—the factors 
outlined above make a pretty good case for regulating firms. These factors do 
not explain, however, why the existing regulatory scheme focuses entirely on 
discrimination by firms, rather than on both firms and customers, nor why that 
regulatory scheme does not require firms to pay more attention to 
discrimination by its customers. Discrimination customer by customer may be 
less significant, on a decision-by-decision basis, than discrimination by firms, 
but it is harmful both in individual instances and in its cumulative effects. 
Moreover, just as we think that a benefit of eliminating discrimination by firms 
is that it lessens discrimination by customers, the converse is also true; if 
customers do not discriminate, neither, presumably, will businesses. 
One could make the case that there is an even greater need for legal 
intervention to reduce customer discrimination than discrimination by firms. 
As noted above, firms tend to be profit-driven and thus already motivated to 
make rational, non-discriminatory decisions.25 Customers are more likely to 
be motivated by personal emotions, stereotypes, and preferences. Whether 
these motivations are conscious or implicit,26 customers typically act on them 
at little or no cost; in most markets, customers can find male lawyers or 
straight photographers or white cashiers to serve them. Even when there are 
costs,27 without having to account for profits in the same way firms do, 
customers may be more willing to pay for their discriminatory preferences 
than firms are.28 If this is the case, by focusing on discrimination by firms 
 
292, 305 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Cynthia Estlund makes a similar point about the beneficial effects of 
contact in the workplace. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 23 (2003). The literature on the benefits of contact in 
reducing prejudice is legion. Much of it builds on the “contact hypothesis” developed by Gordon 
Allport. See generally GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954). For studies linking 
exposure and contact to the reduction of discriminatory biases, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making 
Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 
95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1946–56 (2009). Lee Anne Fennell refers to the possible effect of enlarging 
one’s horizons and altering one’s biases because of the different choices a person might be 
influenced to make as the “learning effect.” See Fennell, supra note 12, at 29. 
 25.  This was a key insight of Becker’s classic work on the economics of discrimination. See 
generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957). 
 26.  There is an extensive literature on implicit bias. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., 
A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 
(2002); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, 
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).  
 27.  In the Airbnb study, for example, hosts who reject black guests are able to find a 
replacement guest only 35% of the time. See Edelman et al., supra note 5.  
 28.  We have oversimplified this analysis to make the point. It might be rational for a  
profit-driven business to discriminate in order, say, to enhance the camaraderie among its men 
(by discriminating against women), or save on search costs. On search costs, see generally Shelly 
J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor 
Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340 (June 1983). Current law would prohibit such an exclusion. 
Conversely, customers might have competitive or profit-driven reasons not to discriminate. Our 
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rather than by customers, current law concentrates on the slice of the market 
that is already strongly motivated to refrain from discrimination, and ignores 
players who do not. 
The larger problem with a legal approach that targets only discrimination 
by firms is that it ignores the complex interaction between business practices 
and customer preferences.  Individual customer preferences and institutional 
practices do not operate separate and apart from each other. Instead, they 
interact in ways that create a feedback loop in which customer bias affects 
business decisions and business decisions reinforce customer bias. These 
phenomena will be examined in turn. 
i.     How Customer Bias Affects Business Decisions 
Customer bias influences decisions by businesses and the opportunities 
of their employees even when the businesses are not directly engaged in 
discriminatory behavior. Take the everyday example of customer service 
employees who face discrimination by customers. When customers steer away 
from store clerks wearing, say, Muslim garb, these workers will tend to 
generate fewer revenues for their employers, and thus may affect employer 
pay and promotion decisions. Prejudiced customers who have no choice but 
to deal with the Muslim workers will give bad evaluations,29 which reinforces 
these employment decisions. Thus, even if the firm (barred from 
discrimination) continues to interview and hire members of racial minorities, 
over time, rational clerks will tend to move themselves to the back office, learn 
to moderate the fact of their racial identity,30 or find a job (less well-paying) 
elsewhere. In this way, customer bias serves to lessen the market value of 
workers against whom customers are biased. 
Another concrete example of customer bias affecting business decisions 
is the disparate pay apparent in male and female coaches in college sports. 
Colleges and universities often pay the coaches of their men’s basketball 
teams (mostly male, in part because of the preferences of the players) more 
than the coaches of female basketball teams (mostly female because, among 
other things, these jobs generally pay less).31 The jobs are arguably similar in 
skill, effort and responsibility—the factors that matter under the Equal Pay 
Act32—and a school’s women’s team is sometimes more successful than the 
 
argument here is that the competitive, economic pressures of a profit-driven business provide 
incentives to refrain from discrimination that are often not present in individual customers.  
 29.  Importantly, the sharing economy has made peer-to-peer evaluations ubiquitous.  
 30.  See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 
(2000) (describing strategies pursued by women and minorities to avoid triggering gender and 
racial stereotyping by others). 
 31.  Coaches of women’s teams are more likely male than vice versa. See Matthew J.X. 
Malady, Sidelined: Why Are There Still No Women Coaching Men’s Sports, and Why Don’t We Care?, SLATE 
(Sept. 28, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/09/ 
female_coaches_why_aren_t_there_more_women_in_charge_of_men_s_teams_.html. 
 32.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
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men’s team.33 The usual justification for the pay differentials in coaching, 
which courts have accepted,34 is that men’s teams are revenue-producing and 
thereby involve working conditions with more stress and responsibility than 
women’s teams, which are not revenue-producing.35 This distinction explains 
the salaries of the most highly-paid coaches but it masks the fundamental 
dynamic at play: the reason men’s teams produce more revenue is that the 
public disproportionately prefers to watch men’s games—i.e., customers 
discriminate. 
One might argue that men’s sports display more talent, strength, 
athleticism, or speed and that these factors, not sex, explain any salary gap. 
But these characteristics are, themselves, gendered. As Deborah Brake writes: 
[t]he popularity and revenue-producing potential of a sport . . . . is 
a product of countless social and institutional factors, including 
longstanding and continuing investments in facilities, personnel, 
programs, recruiting, marketing, and coaching . . . . These 
investments contribute to a certain image and status of a sport that 
greatly affect its marketability.36 
To whatever extent the difference between male and female sports 
relates to factors other than gender, the fact remains that it is primarily 
because fans prefer men’s to women’s sports that men’s sports generate more 
responsibility, stress, and public relations work, and thus more pay for the 
coaches of men’s teams.37 The higher market rewards that flow to male 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1069 
(9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting equal pay claim for an increase of a women’s basketball coach’s salary 
from $60,000 to $150,000 to match salary of men’s basketball coach, even though she was much 
more successful in terms of team wins, but whose average attendance at women’s games was 762, 
as compared to 4,103 for men’s games).  
 34.  See generally  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 
F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting in dictum that revenue differentials might justify pay differences). 
 35.  The N.C.A.A., for example, justifies paying men’s teams roughly $1.56 million per victory in 
their national tournament, as compared to nothing for women’s teams because, it claims, men’s games 
bring in more money. See Andrew Zimbalist, The N.C.A.A.’s Women Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/opinion/the-ncaas-women-problem.html. In pro soccer, the 
top five players on the men’s U.S. national team make an average of $406,000 per year, in comparison 
to $72,000 per year for members of the women’s team. See Carli Lloyd, Carli Lloyd: Why I’m Fighting for 
Equal Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/sports/soccer/carli-
lloyd-why-im-fighting-for-equal-pay.html. 
 36.  Deborah Brake, Revisiting Title IX’s Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the Three-Part Test, 12 
AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 481 (2004); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 120 (1987) (arguing that “being female and being 
athletic have been socially contradictory and that being male and being athletic ha[s] been more 
or less socially synonymous”).  
 37.  See James K. Gentry & Raqual Meyer Alexander, Pay for Women’s Basketball Coaches Lags Far 
Behind That of Men’s Coaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
04/03/sports/ncaabasketball/pay-for-womens-basketball-coaches-lags-far-behind-mens-coaches.html 
(explaining that coaches of men’s teams are paid nearly twice that of coaches of women’s teams and 
that their pay is increasing at a far higher rate). 
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athletes, and to male teams, not only disadvantages female athletes, but sends 
a message about the comparative value of male sports that reinforces these 
preferences. 
Another example of how current law permits businesses to act on, and 
thus perpetuate, the stereotyped-based prejudices of their customers is the 
discretion allowed to businesses to impose gender-based dress and 
appearance standards on their employees.38 In most cases, employers are 
allowed to incorporate the sex-based expectations of their customers into how 
they require their employees to look. As long as the standards track 
community expectations and do not impose manifestly unequal burdens on 
male and female employees, they are not considered discrimination based on 
sex.39 Here, again, an employer is expected to refrain from acting on its own 
biases, but has considerable leeway to conform its practices to the biases of its 
customers. 
Even firm practices that are understood to discriminate based on sex may 
be excused under Title VII’s Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) 
exception, under logic tied directly to customer preferences.40 For example, 
several cases have found sex to be a BFOQ in therapeutic settings in which 
customers expressed strong gender preferences.41 In one case, after nine 
female residents in a female nursing home signed an affidavit objecting “most 
strenuously” to male nurses and male nurse’s aides (although apparently not 
 
 38.  For analysis of the law relating to dress and appearance standards, including standards 
of beauty, as well as how these standards harm women, see generally, DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE 
BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW (2010). 
 39.  In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Harrah’s Casino could specify that the women 
employees in certain job categories should wear face powder, blush, mascara and lip color (“in 
complimentary colors”) and have their hair “teased, curled, or styled” (and “down at all times”), 
while men were not allowed to wear make-up or nail polish and their hair could not be below the 
top of their shirt collars (“[p]onytails are prohibited”). 
 40.  The BFOQ exception applies only to sex discrimination, not race discrimination, 
although there may a kind of de facto BFOQ that operates in some settings, as with police 
departments who hire minority police personnel specifically to work in minority communities. 
See generally Kate Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender Discrimination, 16 DUKE 
J. GENDER. L. & POL’Y 169 (2009). 
 41.  See generally Healey v. Southwood Psych. Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding 
sex as a BFOQ in hiring counselors at psychiatric hospital); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental 
Health, 786 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (permitting sex as BFOQ in positions at psychiatric 
hospital involving assistance to naked or partially dressed patients); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 
666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding sex-based hiring of male and female nurse 
assistants and orderlies where job responsibilities included viewing or touching private parts of 
patients); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (upholding sex as 
BFOQ for cleaning men’s bathhouses). But see EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 
1996) (rejecting sex as a BFOQ in weight-loss centers even though clientele was mostly female 
and did not want men taking their body measurements); Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 
594 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2004) (invalidating hospital policy of hiring only female obstetrics nurses, 
despite evidence that 80% of patients demanded female nurses and female nurses were needed 
as chaperones for male physicians). 
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to male doctors), the nursing home adopted a policy of hiring only female 
nurses; this policy was upheld by the court under the BFOQ exception.42 In 
this way, the law treats customer biases as a given that firms may indulge when 
they can tie those biases to a business purpose.43 
ii.     How Business Practices Reinforce Customer Bias 
Not only do customer biases influence business practices; in addition, 
business practices influence customer preferences. To an important extent, 
“[customers] do not come to the [market] with fully formed preferences”;44 
these preferences emerge, based in part on the choices made available to 
them by firms. Thus, while firms theoretically have no business reason to 
discriminate except for the preferences of their customers, these preferences 
are often ones that the firms, themselves, help to create and nurture. The 
result is a complicated collusion in which discriminatory preferences 
perpetuate themselves without any clearly identifiable starting point. 
This collusion is especially apparent in advertising. Advertising both 
reflects customer preferences and creates or reinforces those preferences. 
The most successful advertising is that which captures and builds on the 
emotional needs and desires of the customer and then associates specific 
products with the fulfillment of those needs. This process is fundamentally a 
social one. Customers, who may not even be aware of their preferences, are 
attracted to images of people with whom they seek to identify.45 Firms 
understand these associational preferences, and seek to exploit them. The 
Marlboro Man ads—sometimes described as “[t]he most powerful . . . brand 
image of the century”46—succeeded because potential customers wanted to 
be identified with the rugged, masculine values the cowboy image represents; 
for those to whom it appeals, smoking is not only acceptable, but also sexy 
and macho. Likewise, the clothing ads of many firms both exploit and 
 
 42.  Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978). 
 43.  In a different context, the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson upheld the exclusion 
of women from jobs as correctional counselors in maximum-security prisons in Alabama because, 
as women, they were more likely to stir up prisoners, thus heightening the risk of sexual assaults 
or other violence. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335–37 (1977). As in other BFOQ cases, 
in Dothard attitudes and prejudices of people outside the challenged employment relationship 
are treated as givens, and used to justify sex-based practices within that relationship. 
 44.  See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1193 (2015). 
Vicki Schultz makes the same argument with respect to employees, whose preferences, she 
argues, are shaped by employer expectations and institutional culture and practices. See Vicki 
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace 
in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815 (1990).  
 45.  See Jennifer L. Aaker et al., Nontarget Markets and Viewer Distinctiveness: The Impact of Target 
Marketing on Advertising Attitudes, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 127, 137 (2000) (demonstrating that 
target marketing induces identification by target audiences, especially among distinctive, non-
majority groups). 
 46.  See The Marlboro Man, ADVERTISINGAGE (March 29, 1999), http://adage.com/article/ 
special-report-the-advertising-century/marlboro-man/140170. 
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construct female body images. An infamous example were the Abercrombie 
& Fitch ads depicting young, skinny girls in seductive poses, as well as tight t-
shirts emblazoned with such slogans as “Who needs a brain when you have 
these?” and “Female students wanted for sexual research.”47 Ads that build on 
racist identity also tap into and reinforce racial stereotypes and prejudice. 
Consider an ad for “Wong Brothers Laundry Service: Two Wongs Can Make 
It White;”48 an Intel ad with six muscular black runners bowing in front of a 
white man dressed in business attire under the headline “maximize the power 
of your employees;”49 and a series of liquor ads depicting white people acting 
out black hip-hop stereotypes.50 
While such ads may be the subject of public criticism or boycotts,51 they 
are not illegal. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines52 held that Southwest Airlines could 
not deny employment to male flight attendants, but it did not disapprove of 
the company’s advertising strategy, designed to distinguish it from other 
airlines by “project[ing] to the traveling public an airline personification of 
feminine youth and vitality.”53 Indeed, there was, and still is, no law under 
which the campaign could have been disapproved, and First Amendment 
considerations likely prevent the state from enacting one. Even in its new 
2015 advertisements (toned down for the times), Southwest Airlines 
continues to be the LUV airline, catering to the positive customer response to 
its sexy imaging.54 Firms are well aware that they aren’t legally responsible for 
the prejudice their ads foster or discriminatory harms they cause.55 
 
 47.  See Lauren Johnson, Abercrombie & Fitch Supports Racism, Sexism and Size Discrimination, 
BEAUTIFUL (May 10, 2013), http://www.beutifulmagazine.com/2013/05/10/abercrombiefitch-
supports-racism-sexism-size-discrimination. 
 48.  See Barbara Herman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Abercrombie & Fitch: In a Multicultural 
Era, Can This Branding Still Work?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
unbearable-whiteness-abercrombie-fitch-multicultural-era-can-branding-still-work-1830958.  
 49.  See, e.g., 10 Recent Racist Ads That Companies Wish You Would Forget, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-most-racist-ads-of-the-modern-era-2012-6?op=0#intel-
released-an-ad-they-knew-was-racist-7 (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See, e.g., text accompanying notes 77–82. 
 52.  Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).  
 53.  Id. at 294 (describing ideal representative of the campaign as a “lady” who “is young 
and vital . . . she is charming and goes through life with great flair and exuberance . . . you notice 
first her exciting smile, friendly air, her wit”). 
 54.  Southwest Airlines’ new makeover, recently unveiled, continues to sport a bold, multi-
color heart, centered on the belly of its aircraft. See Susan Carey, Southwest Airlines Unveils New 
Look Echoing Traditional Image, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 8, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
articles/southwest-airlines-unveils-new-look-echoing-traditional-image-1410191427.  
 55.  Trade magazines make this clear to their readers. See, e.g., Van Thompson, Racial 
Discrimination in Advertisements, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, http://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/racial-
discrimination-advertisements-20941.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2016) (“Racism in advertising is 
not in itself illegal, but that doesn’t mean it’s wise.”). 
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The influence of business practice on customer bias is especially apparent 
in the online economy. As noted above,56 online platforms such as Airbnb, 
Craigslist, Eatwith, Etsy, Rover and many other platforms do not initiate 
transactions as either sellers (who would be regulated) or buyers (who are 
not); rather, they facilitate the transactions of site users—sellers and buyers—
by bringing them together. As facilitators rather than sellers in the usual 
sense, they can disclaim responsibility for the discrimination any of these users 
apply in their searches. Current law allows this.57 
While online sharing platforms do not participate directly as sellers or 
buyers in a transaction, they amass data about their users, both sellers and 
buyers. This data is used to target site users with products and services in which 
their search and buying histories suggest potential interest.58 In directing 
their users to these products and services, these platforms in effect reinforce 
existing preferences and do not expose customers to options that might 
weaken those preferences. 
These platforms not only track the customer’s own preferences in order 
to guide the customer’s future purchases, but they also aggregate the 
preferences of other customers. These aggregations may be viewed as the best 
available data on a matter that is of utility to site users. They are also 
influential, and can help to perpetuate discrimination. Crowd-sourcing apps, 
for example, collect information about the safety of neighborhoods based on 
the reported experiences of users. That information is then consulted by 
other users when they are determining where to shop, dine, or go to the 
movies. Sketch Factor is one such app, and it illustrates the problem.59 To the 
extent that users of Sketch Factor report a neighborhood “sketchy” because 
of the visibility of a significant number of black people in the neighborhood, 
the app builds on stereotypes in a way that is likely to be harmful to black-
owned businesses in that neighborhood.60 Once a neighborhood is deemed 
 
 56.  See supra Part I. 
 57.  Id. There is liability under employment discrimination laws, of course, when the company 
functions as an employer rather than a transaction facilitator. As others have noted, however, there is 
a broader trend away from employer-employee relationships and toward market contracting, even 
without factoring in the phenomenal rise in platforms such as Uber and Airbnb. See generally Matthew 
T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). 
 58.  For a discussion of the impact of data collection by intermediaries like Google, see 
generally Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Privacy and the Rising Income Inequality 
in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849 (2014). 
 59.  See Rich Shapiro, Going to a Sketchy Neighborhood? New App Called SketchFactor Will Tell You, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/new-
sketchfactor-app-shows-streets-safe-article-1.1896091. 
 60.  See Emma Cueto, Sketch Factor App Is Racist—Not On Purpose, but That Doesn’t Make It Better, 
BUSTLE (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/35065-sketch-factor-app-is-racist-not-on-
purpose-but-that-doesnt-make-it-better. This problem was the premise of a November 2015 episode of 
The Good Wife, concerning a black-owned restaurant that saw its business decline, presumably because 
of a mapping app (ChumHum) that rated neighborhood safety by aggregating customer prejudices 
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unsafe—however unfairly that conclusion is reached—subsequent activity by 
consumers is likely to reinforce this conclusion. Fewer whites will visit the 
neighborhood, triggering further user responses indicating that the 
neighborhood is unsafe and magnifying the effects of the stereotyping and 
bias. This phenomenon is called algorithmic discrimination.61 The more 
ubiquitous and trusted these peer-to-peer apps become, the greater their 
potential for influencing the reality that customers, through their decisions, 
reproduce. 
This circularity between business practices and customer preferences 
often make it impossible to know, in any one instance, which drives which. 
One controlled study reported that fake web users pretending to be male job 
seekers were more likely to be shown Google ads for high-paying executive 
jobs than equivalent female job seekers.62 What explains this phenomenon? 
Do searches by female job seekers create a pattern leading the algorithm to 
predict lack of interest in certain job categories by women, as compared to 
their male counterparts? Or do hiring decisions create the pattern that leads 
the algorithm to predict more frequent matches between high-paying jobs 
and men, and thus to facilitate these matches? It is hard to know what drives 
what, when layers of aggregated data launder the reality that the data helps to 
create and sustain. 
Naomi Schoenbaum identifies another concern with these unregulated, 
online platforms that exemplifies the role that a firm’s business plan can play 
in reinforcing customer bias. Schoenbaum explains that online sharing 
platforms are more likely to involve intimate activities (e.g., dating sites) and 
intimate spaces (e.g., home services like TaskRabbit or Handyman), and to 
entail the exchange of private information between buyer and seller (e.g., 
Airbnb). Schoenbaum argues that the greater the intimacy of the transactions 
conducted in the sharing economy, the more likely and the more explicitly 
sex bias influences the transaction, and, therefore the more likely, and 
acceptable over time, sex discrimination becomes.63 The lack of structural 
features in the sharing economy that have constrained discrimination in the 
traditional economy, like Equal Employment Opportunity procedures and 
 
about unsafe neighborhoods. See Rachel Goodman, The Good Wife Tackles Algorithmic Discrimination. 
Meanwhile, in Real Life. . ., ACLU (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/good-wife-
tackles-algorithmic-discrimination-meanwhile-real-life. 
 61.  See Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html; see also Salon 
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677–92 (2016) 
(describing how supposedly neutral data aggregation has the potential to exacerbate discrimination).  
 62.  See Amit Datta et al., Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings, 1 PROC. ON PRIVACY 
ENHANCING TECHS. 92, 105 (Apr. 2015). 
 63.  See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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face-to-face contact between employees and managers, makes the situation 
worse.64 
In sum, it is wrong to assume, in either the traditional economy or the 
sharing economy, that discrimination by customers and firm practices are 
distinct from one another. The efficacy argument for regulating firms 
assumes both that firm practices operate largely independently of customer 
biases, and that firms have the capacity to stop discrimination by simply not 
discriminating themselves. This is not so. Firm and consumer preferences are 
interactive, cumulative, and often mutually self-justifying. The question, 
examined later in Part IV, is what the law should do about it. 
B. PRIVACY AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
1. The Privacy and Individual Autonomy Rationale 
Another potentially powerful explanation for why the law focuses on firm 
behavior and not customers is the societal commitment to privacy and 
individual autonomy. This explanation is founded on a commitment to the 
view that, however undesirable an individual customer’s prejudices may be, 
they are prejudices that an individual in a free society has a right to have. 
Although the aim of anti-discrimination law is to change how individuals act, 
not what they believe, the privacy rationale views decisions about what a 
customer buys, with whom she dines, and what entertainment she pursues as 
so basic to the customer’s sense of private identity—including the highly 
protected domains of her religion and her politics—that they should be made 
without the interference of the state.65 
Public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes already recognize the 
privacy rationale. As a matter of constitutional law, the duty not to 
discriminate set forth in these statutes does not apply if a business, club, or 
other operation is sufficiently “private” or intimate to implicate members’ 
constitutionally-protected rights of freedom of expression and association.66 
These rights are especially strong when the organization has a political or 
religious interest, and are even more strenuously protected when the 
expressive interest of the organization is exclusionary and unpopular. A white 
male supremacist group like the American Front may exclude women and 
minorities; the Rotary Club may not. 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Adrienne Davis calls this right “decisional privacy.” See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Sex 
Work: Erotic Assimilationism, Erotic Exceptionalism, and the Challenge of Intimate Labor, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1195, 1237–39 (2015).  
 66.  See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) 
(holding that the Rotary Club is not sufficiently private to be exempt, under the First 
Amendment, from public accommodation anti-discrimination obligations); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (holding that a civil rights organization established to protect 
individual rights from government intrusion has First Amendment rights that protect it from state 
charges against its attorneys for barratry and champerty). 
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Furthermore, associational rights include the freedom to engage in 
discriminatory behavior in private spaces—freedom that is not allowed in 
more public settings.67 Accordingly, although under federal law it is illegal to 
discriminate in the sale and rental of housing, there is an exemption from 
anti-discrimination rules for units in small, owner-occupied buildings.68 
Consistent with the perceived difference between the public and the private, 
the exemption is lost if the landlord publicly advertises the availability of the 
unit on a discriminatory basis.69 These details illustrate how, despite the 
constitutional importance of privacy and autonomy, they are neither absolute 
nor self-executing, as the next section further explores. 
2. Limitations on the Privacy Rationale for Regulating Only 
Discrimination by Firms 
The broadly shared expectation of a privacy and autonomy right of 
individuals to make their own market decisions is deep and strong, but it bears 
a closer look in the broader historical context of anti-discrimination laws. 
Race and gender theorists have long observed that society deems an action 
private or public not because of its inherent boundaries, but on the basis of 
society’s evolving values.70 At any particular regulatory moment, the zone of 
privacy or associational interests that society decides to protect reflects a 
comparative weighing of competing interests. In the 1950s, whether racial 
integration was important enough to justify intruding into the individual’s 
private sphere of association was an open question. At the time, as respected 
a scholar as Herbert Wechsler could write that “integration forces an 
association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant,” and that 
“[g]iven a situation where the state must practically choose between denying 
the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who 
would avoid it,” allowing people to avoid repugnant associations could well be 
the value best supported by “neutral principles” in the Constitution.71  Robert 
Bork was less guarded when he identified as a principle of “unsurpassed 
 
 67.  Adrienne Davis calls this “spatial privacy.” See Davis, supra note 65, at 1235–37. 
 68.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012).  
 69.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
 70.  The literature is massive. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s 
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 151–57 
(David Kairys rev. ed., 1990) (arguing that public and private labels are socially constructed 
ones); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1497, 1563–67 (1983) (criticizing the public/private dichotomy between family and 
market as based on political and social values, not inherent distinctions). 
 71.  See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
34 (1959) (suggesting that as between “denying the association to those individuals who wish it” 
and not “imposing it on those who would avoid it,” the latter would be given higher value). 
Twenty-five years later, Justice Powell expressed a similar view, when he argued that law firms 
should be allowed to associate themselves as they wished, even if this meant discrimination based 
on sex. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79–80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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ugliness” the view that “if I find your behavior ugly by my standards, moral or 
aesthetic, and if you prove stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, 
I am justified in having the state coerce you into more righteous paths.”72 
Judge Bork’s views had considerable support in 1963, but these opinions 
would garner little agreement today if raised as an argument against public 
accommodations law. Likewise, domestic abuse—once viewed as a private 
matter into which the state should not intrude73—today is considered an 
appropriate sphere of state interference.74 Conversely, courts recently have 
expanded privacy protections in some matters once thought suitable for 
public regulation, including campaign finance and gun control.75 For better 
or worse, the law about what decisions belong to individuals and not the state 
has changed, and continues to evolve. 
Looking back over the zones of privacy and autonomy that society used 
to take for granted, it should be clear that, in the context of customer 
discrimination, it is not enough to assert that individual privacy and autonomy 
are important interests. It must also be shown that they are more important than 
the interests with which they compete, including non-discrimination goals. 
When society prohibits markets in heroin and body parts, it infringes on 
people’s right to choose to participate in these markets in order to advance a 
 
 72.  Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21, 22; see also 
Christopher W. Schmidt, Defending the Right to Discriminate: The Libertarian Challenge to the Civil 
Rights Movement, in SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY (Sally C. Hadden 
& Patricia Minter eds., 2013). 
 73.  See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905); see also MODEL PENAL 
CODE §213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980) (AM. LAW INST. 1980) (explaining the need for spousal immunity 
in rape cases on the grounds that liability would “thrust the prospect of criminal sanctions into 
the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship”).  
 74.  The debate is ongoing about the appropriate level of state interference, given 
competing goals individual protection and individual autonomy. See generally, e.g., JEANNIE SUK, 
AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 
(2009) (arguing that the breakdown of the boundary between public and private space that the 
domestic violence revolution helped to accomplish has reduced autonomy and privacy for both 
women and men); Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated Fragmentation” 
and Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307 (2009) (urging mandatory prosecution in 
domestic violence cases, but with a loosely coupled set of services to mediate the effects of state 
intrusion on women’s privacy and autonomy interests); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of 
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) (arguing that the failure of the state to intervene in 
domestic violence is itself a form of violence).  
 75.  See generally MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that gun 
control regulation violates Second Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(holding that campaign finance limits violate First Amendment rights of a non-profit 
organization); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking down D.C. gun 
control rules). For discussion of the link between gun rights and interests in privacy and 
autonomy, see generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009). See also Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and 
Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
333, 337 (2004) (reviewing GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E. Harcourt 
ed., 2003)) (identifying the association of the gun with a form of individual autonomy). 
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more important interest in protecting its citizens. The question, therefore, is 
what value society now places on its commitment to anti-discrimination in 
relation to the competing values relating to privacy and autonomy. 
In legal debates about discrimination, there has been no serious attempt 
to weigh the strength of society’s present interest in preventing customers 
from discriminating, in its various forms, against society’s present 
commitment to personal privacy and autonomy for its citizens. Without this 
inquiry, the privacy and autonomy rationales are arguments, not justifications. 
Such inquiry requires attention to context. Some types of customer 
discriminations are not as harmful as others, and some limits on customer 
discrimination are more intrusive than the alternatives. The relevant context 
includes the fact that today’s online platform economy already represents a 
massive voluntary and unregulated “sharing” of personal information, 
including physical locations, pictures, tastes, travel patterns, work hours, 
passport and drivers’ license data, and financial details. Given the many uses 
to which this information is put, it cannot be assumed, categorically, that this 
information should not be used, even a little bit, to curtail race and gender 
discrimination. 
How to prioritize the competing interests is considered in more detail in 
the next sections. The point, here, is that any line drawing in this area reflects 
some set of priorities. While the privacy rationale offers some explanatory 
power for why the law does not regulate the exercise of customer bias, it begs 
the question it purports to answer: is the reduction of race and gender 
discrimination an important enough goal to consider some limits on 
customer choice to help achieve it? 
III.     SOME DISTINCTIONS 
Not all forms of customer discrimination are equally harmful and 
unacceptable. There are differences between biased choices, both in kind and 
in degree, that may determine the optimal legal approach for addressing 
discrimination by customers. Some discrimination by customers is clearly 
harmful and not justified by competing values; this discrimination warrants 
the greatest attention. Other kinds of discrimination might appropriately be 
viewed as acceptable and even desirable—ones with which the law should not 
attempt to interfere. Still other forms of customer discrimination are harmful 
but nonetheless should be left alone because of the costs of trying to prevent 
them. 
Sorting customer discrimination into these categories is a fraught task 
and necessarily tentative. Our suggestions reflect our own values, without the 
benefit of the debate we hope this article will stimulate. In this section, we sort 
some examples into these categories, at least tentatively, in an effort to provide 
a fuller context for analyzing appropriate responses to discrimination by 
customers. 
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A. ACCEPTABLE (EVEN DESIRABLE) CUSTOMER DISCRIMINATION 
Some customer discrimination might be considered tolerable, even 
desirable, because it helps to reverse historical patterns of discrimination that 
subordinate people based on a protected characteristic, like race or sex. 
Customers sometimes discriminate by race or gender, in concert, to promote 
non-discrimination goals. The bus boycott by blacks in Montgomery, Alabama 
in the mid-1950s was instrumental in creating awareness of racial segregation 
in the South and, ultimately, in stimulating the civil rights movement. A 
“girlcott” started by teenagers in 2005 brought attention to Abercrombie & 
Fitch’s sales and marketing strategies that contributed to unhealthy body 
images for girls.76 Customers have also boycotted Russian vodka to try to 
promote the change of Russia’s anti-gay laws.77 Today, numerous consumer 
campaigns are directed at helping black-owned businesses and to provide 
opportunities that have long been disproportionately denied to them. 
BLACKOUT is an international movement designed to encourage customer 
to redirect their spending and investments to black-owned companies.78 Some 
brands, like FUBU (“For Us By Us”) are designed to draw customers seeking 
to keep their business within the black community.79 Even the federal 
government, acting as customer, engages in discriminatory purchasing 
decisions when it imposes minority set-aside requirements on federal 
contractors.80 A truly “color-” or “gender-blind” approach to combatting 
customer discrimination would not distinguish these instances from the rest. 
We would allow these practices, however, because they diminish gender and 
racial inferiority and subordination rather than contribute to it.81 
B. REGRETFULLY ALLOWED CUSTOMER DISCRIMINATION 
Other customer discrimination may be undesirable but outweighed by 
the customer’s interest in privacy and personal autonomy. It is not an easy 
matter to decide what belongs in this category, but online dating sites might 
 
 76.  Jay Karlson, 10 Famous Boycotts, LISTVERSE (Sept. 3, 2011), http://listverse.com/2011/ 
09/03/10-famous-boycotts.  
 77.  See Tansy Hoskins, Can Consumer Boycotts Change the World?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2013, 
7:58 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/consumer-boycott-change-world.  
 78.  See Buy Black Today, BLACK BUS. NETWORK, http://www.blackbusinessnetwork.com/ 
Store (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).  
 79.  See FUBU COLLECTION, http://www.fubu.com (last visited Sept.12, 2016). 
 80.  See Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 1964–65 Comp., p. 339. 
 81.  See Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017, 1033 (2006) 
(proposing that customer discrimination should only be prohibited if it “exacerbate[s] or 
contribute[s] to a pattern of social marginalization leading to political exclusion and injustice”). 
This position aligns itself more broadly with a nonsubordination approach to race and sex 
discrimination. Among classic defenses of the position are Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); and Reva Siegel, 
The Supreme Court 2012 Term, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).  
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be the best example. Who someone dates is a very personal matter, integral 
to an individual’s social and sexual identity.82 Who to date is not simply a 
private choice, but it concerns activities that often take place in private spaces 
to which courts have afforded special protection.83 Whether or not sexual 
desire is as inherent to one’s identity as is commonly assumed, the fact 
remains that the freedom to make one’s own choices with respect to one’s 
sexuality, family, and procreation is one of this nation’s most protected 
constitutional rights.84 It seems appropriate to grant this same freedom in 
market transactions. If individuals can apply their own selective criteria in 
choosing with whom to dance in a bar—hardly something one can imagine 
being the subject of state regulation—it seems reasonable that they also be 
able to do so when they access a commercial dating site.85 
This concession to personal privacy and choice in the online dating world 
is not without cost, from an anti-discrimination standpoint. Race selection in 
dating helps to maintain the distinctions upon which racial hierarchy is based 
and perpetuates current biases in dating markets, especially the bias against 
black women.86 The exercise of these biases, though, seems best understood 
as a regretful consequence of living in a free society. Few people, even if they 
applaud the goal of race-neutral dating and follow that goal in their own 
personal dating decisions, would be willing to sacrifice their own ability to 
make unfettered decisions involving their sexuality in order to advance 
society’s broader goal of anti-discrimination. For this reason, it seems 
doubtful that any amount of debate would likely lead to the regulation of 
online dating and sex sites like Match.com, Peppr and Tinder in order to 
prevent customers from making choices based on race or gender preferences. 
A similar example of customer discrimination that we would deem 
regretfully allowable is the choice of a roommate. Again, this kind of choice 
affects both intimate activities and intimate spaces that we ordinarily protect 
from public intrusion. In its 2012 holding that it is not a violation of the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act for Roommate.com to allow its 
users to select roommates based on race, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reasoned: 
 
 82.  See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 83.  See generally id.  
 84.  See generally id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex 
rel. Williams, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
 85.  See generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (arguing that while the state has an important role 
in facilitating relationships and interactions across lines of race, gender, and disability, individuals 
should not be directly pressured into crossing these barriers).  
 86.  See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 
MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 33 (2011) (citing statistics showing that black women have the 
lowest marriage rates of any group, due in part to a high black incarceration rate and the fact that black 
men are three times more likely to marry outside of their race than black women).  
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The home is the center of our private lives. Roommates note our 
comings and goings, observe whom we bring back at night, hear 
what songs we sing in the shower, see us in various stages of undress 
and learn intimate details most of us prefer to keep private. 
Roommates also have access to our physical belongings and to our 
person.87 
As with dating sites, a hands-off approach to roommate discrimination is 
likely to disproportionately affect members of racial minority groups, given 
the disproportionate bias they face in other settings. At the same time, the 
privacy considerations attending one’s private living space are compelling 
enough to make forced anti-discrimination standards impractical. The same 
reasoning would not apply to colleges and universities when they deliberately 
design roommate matches for the educational purpose of enlarging students’ 
horizons.88 
Likewise, it is hard to imagine a direct ban on race matching in the sperm 
donor market.89 This choice also carries the potential of harmful 
discrimination, yet it goes to deeply intimate decisions about who might 
procreate, and how, along with deeply personal interests in controlling one’s 
own self-definition. 
There may also be personal services that are so intimate in nature and 
space that they, too, should be largely protected on privacy and autonomy 
grounds. Massage therapists and psychiatrists may fit this category. A massage 
therapist’s services, arguably, cannot be effectively performed where the client 
does not feel comfortable, relaxed, and safe from sexual threat. The same 
reasoning does not apply to preferences that result from stereotypes linking 
sex to competence, such as hospital patients’ preferences for female nurses 
or male doctors.90 Others might classify these cases differently91 but, as a 
general matter, the goal should be to respect customer choices in especially 
 
 87.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1221 
(9th Cir. 2012). For an earlier decision to the contrary in the context of two roommates who 
were looking for a third, see Larrick, FEHC Dec. No. 98-12, 1998 WL 750901 (Cal. Fair Emp. & 
Housing Commission July 22, 1998). 
 88.  Allowing people to discriminate based on race and sex in choosing a roommate also 
would not prohibit the establishment of a law making it harder to discriminate, such as by 
prohibiting advertising on a discriminatory basis, as in the fair housing context with respect to 
owner-occupied small units. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 28–29. Such constraints, though, are 
more often associated with disapproved customer discrimination, discussed in the next section. 
An argument can be made, as Fennell does, that roommate discrimination belongs in that 
category. We do not take that position, but consider it a close case. 
 89.  The matter is hardly free from complication. See generally Dov Fox, Racial Classification in 
Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844 (2009); Guido Pennings, The Right to Choose Your Donor: A Step 
Towards Commercialization or a Step Towards Empowering the Patient?, 15 HUM. REPROD. 508 (2000). 
 90.  But see infra text accompanying notes 96–99. 
 91.  See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 44, at 1190–96 (resisting any BFOQ exception for 
personal services). 
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personal settings while putting continued pressure on the stereotypes that 
influence those choices in a biased way. 
C. DISAPPROVED CUSTOMER DISCRIMINATIONS 
The third category are those customer choices that cause harm to others 
and do not as seriously implicate the kinds of privacy interests discussed above. 
In this category we would include race and gender bias by customers when 
they avoid store clerks on account of their race and gender or evaluate them 
in a discriminatory way. We would also include race and gender bias in 
tipping, buying an iPod, or renting weekend accommodations. Limitations in 
these instances infringe on customer choice to some degree, but do not 
intrude on particularly intimate spaces and activities. In this regard, these 
actions are more like political campaign contributions, bribery, or buying 
drugs—activities which the state regulates from the customer side despite the 
intrusion of that regulation on individual choice—than like dating sites and 
massage therapists. 
At present, as regards to sex discrimination in the employment sphere, 
the line between permitted customer discrimination and disapproved 
discrimination is policed through Title VII’s BFOQ exception, discussed 
above.92 It is a line that has evolved over time, as attitudes about discrimination 
have evolved. At one time, case law held that sex was a BFOQ in a wide variety 
of prison and medical facility cases.93 Courts have pulled back on the 
exception,94 and today these cases are comparatively rare. So, too, as customer 
stereotypes diminish over time, the kinds of discriminatory preferences that 
are deemed necessary to protect customer privacy interests should also shrink. 
Some cases are truly borderline and will be especially controversial. Take 
choices about one’s doctor, which many patients consider to be highly 
personal. This choice can be influenced by race and gender stereotypes—that 
white male professionals are more competent than their female or minority 
counterparts—and allowing sex or race selection reinforces these stereotypes 
and deprives women and minorities of professional opportunities. To be sure, 
patients may have a higher comfort level with doctors who reflect their 
stereotypes about competence, which may produce better outcomes.95 Yet the 
same thing could be said about other professional relationships in fields such 
 
 92.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 93.  See supra notes 40–43.  
 94.  See generally Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
sex is not a BFOQ for working in women’s prison); Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 594 
S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2004) (holding that sex is not a BFOQ for hiring only female obstetric nurses, 
despite evidence that 80% of patients demanded female nurses). 
 95.  See generally Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of 
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462 (2012) (arguing that doctor–patient race- and gender-
preference accommodations serve therapeutic goals, and also lessen the problem of 
discrimination against minorities in the provision of health care). 
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as the lawyer–client relationship, in which we do not allow sex and race 
discrimination. 
At the same time, some reasons for wanting to choose one’s own doctor 
are in line, at least somewhat, with anti-discrimination goals. After a history of 
male control over women’s reproductive lives, for example, many women 
prefer female gynecologists, and believe that they receive better care from 
them.96 Similarly, after a history of subpar medical care, many black patients 
prefer black doctors, whom they believe are less likely to discriminate against 
them.97 Research shows, in fact, that because of discrimination in the 
provision of medical care, sex-matching or race-matching may produce 
higher objective levels of medical care.98 
These are tough cases requiring especially creative strategies—strategies 
that might both take account of the “ordinary” case in which customer 
discrimination should be prevented, if possible, and cases in which anti-
discrimination goals might be best met by allowing sex- or race-based 
decisions by customers. Society has largely avoided the questions that might 
give rise to the development of those strategies. This Article asks these 
questions and, in the next Part, attempts to provide a possible framework for 
resolving them. 
IV.     AN APPROACH TO CUSTOMER DISCRIMINATION 
It bears repeating that existing law already restricts customer preference 
to a certain extent. By making it illegal for employers, landlords and other 
providers of public accommodations to discriminate based on race and 
gender, the law indirectly limits customer choices about who they work with 
and buy from.99 But discrimination persists that the law does not even try to 
 
 96.  See Elizabeth A. Howell et al., Do Women Prefer Female Obstetricians?, 99 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1031, 1031 (2002) (showing that based on convenience sample, 34% of women 
preferred a female gynecologist); Julie Schmittdiel et al., Women’s Provider Preferences for Basic 
Gynecology Care in a Large Health Maintenance Organization, 8 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH & GENDER-BASED 
MED. 825, 825 (1999) (showing that 52.2% of women in a large health maintenance 
organization preferred female gynecologists).  
 97.  See Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race Health Care Providers 
and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health Care, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 173,  
183–84 (2006) (showing that racial minorities are generally more likely to seek a doctor of the 
same race, possibly because of general perceptions of discrimination in the provision of health 
care and the belief that physicians are less likely to discriminate against patients of their own 
race); Aasim I. Padela et al., Patient Choice of Provider Type in the Emergency Department: Perceptions 
and Factors Relating to Accommodation of Requests for Care Providers, 27 EMERGENCY MED. J. 465, 466 
(2010) (citing a convenience study of physicians concluding that 24% of patients believe that 
they get better care from a physician of the same gender, and 32% of patients believe they get 
better care from a physician of the same race).  
 98.  See, e.g., Marianne Schmid et al., Racial Differences in the Surgical Care of Medicare 
Beneficiaries with Localized Prostate Cancer, 2 JAMA ONCOLOGY 85, 85 (2016) (showing that in the 
treatment of localized prostate cancer, black patients had a seven-day treatment delay and were 
less likely to undergo lymph-node dissection). 
 99.  See supra Part II.A.1.  
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stop. In this Part, we turn to the regulatory analysis. Are there regulatory tools 
that might curtail this discrimination effectively and without unacceptable 
infringement on customer privacy and autonomy? 
We conclude that, even as to the forms of discrimination society should 
deem least acceptable, a direct prohibition of discrimination by customers is 
not the place to start. Instead, we make a modest proposal to enlarge slightly 
the obligations that firms already have. 
A. THE CASE AGAINST AN OUTRIGHT PROHIBITION 
The most obvious strategy for reducing customer discrimination would 
be an outright prohibition, analogous to the prohibition of discrimination by 
firms in employment and public accommodations. A direct prohibition is 
attractive because it would acknowledge the harm of customer discrimination, 
recognize that prohibiting discrimination by firms does not reach all forms of 
harmful discrimination by customers, and state a public norm against this 
discrimination. A prohibition against customer discrimination would also take 
seriously the proposition that customer privacy and autonomy interests are 
not trump cards that take automatic priority over the competing interests 
society has in ending discrimination. 
Nonetheless, we are reluctant to advocate for a direct constraint against 
customer discrimination. Our reasons bring us back to the justifications we 
first examined for refraining from regulation against customers: efficacy and 
privacy. 
In Part II.A, we questioned some assumptions about the efficacy of a firm-
only regulatory approach to discrimination, but not the basic proposition that 
regulating firm discrimination is generally more efficient than regulating 
discrimination by customers. One additional piece of evidence for this 
proposition is the disuse of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to 
attack discrimination by customers.100 While section 1981 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race in private contracts, there are virtually no 
reported cases of section 1981 being applied against individual (i.e., non-
corporate) customers,101 nor is there any serious discussion in the literature, 
either academic or practitioner, about the potential uses of section 1981 as a 
tool against discrimination by customers.102 This suggests, among other 
things, that most customer interactions are probably too fleeting and lacking 
in meaningful documentation for any disgruntled seller to chase after a 
potentially discriminatory customer with a legal action. 
While the case for a hands-off approach to customer discrimination is not 
fully established by the efficacy rationale, a direct prohibition on customer 
 
 100.  Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
 101.  See supra note 12. 
 102.  For consideration of the application of section 1982 to home seekers, see Fennell, supra 
note 12. 
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stereotyping would also likely be a regulatory nightmare. The problem is not 
that we cannot track consumer behavior; most of our consumer searches and 
purchases are already monitored in the private sector, and the collected 
information, such as individual “likes” and “dislikes” is traded in the market.103 
The problem is, rather, determining what constitutes discrimination—would 
it be one act, or many? How many? Would discriminatory intent need to be 
shown (if so, how?), or would a pattern of discriminatory decisions be 
sufficient? How convincing would that pattern have to be? Would a pattern of 
discrimination be shown by successive acts against different sellers, or would 
there need to be a sufficient number of discriminatory decisions harming the 
same seller? What kind of harm, if any, would have to be shown? 
There is the further matter of customer privacy, examined in Part II.B. 
Even if a generalized interest in privacy does not justify the absence of all legal 
strategies to reduce discrimination by customers, it suggests the desirability of 
a protective zone within which customers can make buying decisions, at least 
certain kinds, without the threat of legal action. This is a strategic concern, as 
well as a legal one. Behavioral research has shown that when legal coercion 
deeply transgresses people’s sense of themselves, they respond defensively 
with resentment and defiance, rather than acceptance.104 Since the most 
meaningful progress toward non-discrimination entails changing the 
underlying attitudes on which discriminatory actions—intended or not—are 
based, this kind of response is especially counter-productive. Having to pay 
bridge tolls or meet carbon emission standards is one thing; these are 
annoyances (even sometimes expensive annoyances) that generally do not 
challenge a person’s sense of identity, self-definition, or feeling of personal 
freedom. Constraints on to whom to rent an extra bedroom, how much to tip 
a restaurant server, or what parameters one can set on an online dating 
service, are more personal. While strong, normative messages disapproving of 
discrimination are essential to reshaping norms,105 indirect strategies may be 
more effective than coercive rules in transmitting those norms. 
 
 103.  Companies like Alibaba have so much information about their customers that they 
appear to be using that information to evaluate their customers (good, bad, etc.) so as to be able 
to determine how much credit to give them. See Neil Gough, Alibaba Data to Help Provide Credit 
Ratings, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan 28, 2015, 3:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/28/alibaba-creates-a-consumer-credit-rating-service. 
 104.  See generally Michelle M. Duguid & Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt, Condoning Stereotyping?: How 
Awareness of Stereotyping Prevalence Impacts Expression of Stereotypes, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 343 (2014) 
(describing experiments suggesting that knowledge about stereotypes actually increased stereotype-
consistent behaviors); see also Bartlett, supra note 24, at 1936–41 (summarizing the research); Adam 
Grant & Sheryl Sandberg, Opinion, When Talking About Bias Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/opinion/sunday/adam-grant-and-sheryl-sandberg-on-
discrimination-at-work.html. 
 105.  See Bartlett, supra note 24, at 1934–35. 
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B. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Consideration of regulatory alternatives brings us back to the firm, the 
party upon whom society, for good reasons, already relies to reduce 
discrimination. As noted above, firms, particularly large and well-resourced 
ones, collect enormous amounts of information about their customers.106 
They know their customers’ preferences and buying habits. They have the 
ability to structure the choices they give customers, influence their 
preferences and habits, and distribute the costs of discrimination that they are 
unable, or not required, to eliminate.107 
With these factors in mind, we propose that entities that already have a 
legal obligation not to discriminate—i.e., employers of a certain size, 
educational institutions, and entities subject to public accommodations 
laws—also should have an explicit obligation to curtail and not to facilitate 
discrimination by their customers, and to refrain from discrimination when 
they, themselves, act in the role of a customer. 
The proposal has features that address each of the concerns spelled out 
in the prior sections of this article. First, it imposes duties only upon those 
who already have an anti-discrimination duty—that is, firms of a certain size. 
Our analysis of the reasons society does not directly regulate customer choice 
concluded that, while these reasons do not seem strong enough to abandon 
an appropriate societal concern with customer discrimination, they are 
practical realities: it is generally easier and cheaper for the state to regulate 
firms than customers, and direct regulation against customers will both 
interfere with the important value of customer choice and be perceived as so 
offensive to privacy and autonomy values as to be counterproductive to the 
kind of fundamental changes in people’s preferences necessary to bring 
about a more open and inclusive society. 
By avoiding a direct obligation on the customer, our suggestion blunts 
the force of these concerns and realities. The proposal requires only those 
already having an anti-discrimination obligation to avoid facilitating the kind 
of behavior by others that they are not allowed to engage in themselves. It 
recognizes that it is easier to regulate firms than individuals, without giving 
up on the goal of inhibiting customer discrimination. In concession to privacy 
concerns, the proposed rule does not impose any direct obligations against 
customers, nor does it interfere directly with those choices. The rule 
accommodates an exception along the lines of the BFOQ exception to Title 
VII in situations in which the most compelling instances implicating customer 
privacy are at risk, although its presumed effect would be to gradually reduce 
customer bias, and thus to decrease the need for the exception. By not 
involving the state directly in monitoring customer behavior, the indirect 
approach avoids the practical enforcement difficulties associated with that 
 
 106.  See supra notes 23, 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See Rogers, supra note 23, at 90.  
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monitoring. It also minimizes concerns about backlash arising from state-
initiated regulation, relying instead on firms, who make all other business 
decisions, to find the means to inhibit discrimination by their customers. 
With these general advantages, questions remain as to the proposal’s 
scope and detailed application. The next section expands these details. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL 
As noted above, anti-discrimination law already, to a certain extent, 
requires businesses to act in ways that prevent customers from exercising their 
discriminatory preferences.108 Despite some favorable authority along these 
lines, however, current law generally does not hold firms accountable for 
customer discrimination that their own practices allow and that they could 
prevent. Laws prohibiting disparate impact discrimination in the employment 
arena,109 which are directed against rules and practices that have a 
disproportionate impact against a protected class,110 might have been useful 
to this end. Unfortunately, courts have thrown up roadblocks to disparate 
impact claims. For example, courts have held that plaintiffs must identify a 
particular practice that causes the disparate impact,111 which can be next to 
impossible to do in the case of customer discrimination, given the often 
interactive nature of decisions that no one party controls.112 Courts also have 
been, by and large, unwilling to consider non-statistical showings of impact or 
to credit broader societal data about the effects of a business practice.113 The 
proposed rule would override these limitations when customer bias causes 
harm and there are reasonable ways businesses could change their practices 
to prevent that harm. 
 
 108.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 109.  Title VII and the Fair Housing Act impose such a prohibition. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (defining unlawful employment practices based on disparate 
impact); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).  
 110.  For scholarly works discussing disparate impact discrimination, its relation to disparate 
treatment discrimination, and the barriers to its success as a robust tool to reduce discrimination, 
see generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested 
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking 
Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005); see also generally Tristin K. Green, 
The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011) 
(articulating a theory of systemic discrimination that includes disparate impact cases within 
disparate treatment law).  
 111.  See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989) (“As a general 
matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular 
employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.”); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee 
Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997) (“To prove a disparate impact claim, Ilhardt must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular employment practice had an adverse 
disparate impact on women on the basis of their sex.”).  
 112.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 113.  See Ilhardt, 118 F.3d at 1156–57. More generally, and for other cites, see Joanna L. 
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 615–18 (2010).  
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An advantage of the proposal is that it reaches firms like Amazon, Uber, 
and Airbnb that are primarily intermediaries of the transactions of others. 
Because of their enormous data-gathering capacities, these firms are even 
better equipped to affect their customers’ behavior than traditional firms.114 
Today, they have no such responsibility.115 Under the proposal, these firms 
would now be responsible for not only the treatment of their own employees 
and the public they serve, but also for the ways in which their platforms 
facilitate discrimination by their customers. 
There are a number of ways firms can respond to the obligation imposed 
by the proposed rule. One easy, albeit minimal, step would be to proactively 
declare that they will not accede to the discriminatory preferences of their 
customers, and to demand a promise from their users not to discriminate.116 
This kind of policy may be difficult to enforce, but nonetheless would help to 
strengthen a norm against discrimination by customers. Corporate self-
identification with anti-discrimination goals could become as standard as the 
current practice of announcing oneself to be an equal opportunity employer.  
So could policies intended to put teeth in these announcements. Some 
online companies like Google already have policies limiting the kinds of 
information their users can demand from each other.117 Airbnb has recently 
announced a host of reforms, including promoting the use of Instant Book, 
which allows qualified guests to book without prior host approval, making 
guest photos less prominent in the booking process (on an experimental 
basis), blocking a booking after a host has previously denied the booking to a 
qualified guest, and instituting a program called Open Doors, to help guests 
find books when they have faced discrimination in the booking process.118 
 
 114.  See Rogers, supra note 23, at 90.  
 115.  See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm’n v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that in allowing its online customers to post housing ads that state racial preferences, 
Craigslist does not violate fair housing discrimination statutes).  
   116.     Lending Club exacts a promise from its users not to discriminate. See Kadhim Shubber, 
Lenders Can’t Discriminate, But What About Investors?, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Jan. 13, 2016, 6:02 
PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/13/2150093/lenders-cant-discriminate-but-what-
about-investors. Airbnb will require a similar commitment as of November 1, 2016. See infra note 119. 
 117.  See Kevin Montgomery, Google’s Ad System Has Become Too Big to Control, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2015, 
2:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/googles-ad-system-become-big-control. Constraining the 
use of stereotyping of discriminatory information will be more difficult, however, and not always in the 
interests of the firm. Id.  
 118.  See LAURA W. MURPHY, AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND BUILD 
INCLUSION: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO AIRBNB (2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ 
REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf. Notably, the set of 
reforms does not appear to change Airbnb’s policy of requiring users to waive their right to bring 
a class action against the company as a condition of using the site. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Vows 
to Fight Racism, but Its Users Can’t Sue to Prompt Fairness, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2016), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/technology/airbnb-vows-to-fight-racism-but-its-users-cant-sue-
to-prompt-fairness.html. For criticisms by two economists that the recent reforms do not go far 
enough in terms of incentives and transparency, see Ray Fisman & Michael Luca, Airbnb Isn’t 
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Such policies both reduce opportunities for discrimination, and the costs of 
discrimination to its victims. Businesses can use these kinds of policies to 
brand themselves in a positive way. Early movers, even if they find themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage in the near term, might be expected to gain 
reputationally in the long run.119 Indeed, businesses are likely to conclude 
that enacting such policies voluntarily benefit them more than waiting for 
litigation,120 or public outcry.121 
Responding to consumer bias, in some contexts, gives businesses a 
chance to iterate and reinforce their corporate values. Fox News arguably did 
this when it stood up to Donald Trump’s demands that Megyn Kelly be 
dropped as a moderator for one of the Republican presidential candidate 
debates. Trump’s demands were in retaliation for Kelly challenging Trump 
on his sexist views at a prior debate122 and, without Fox’s tough stand, might 
have damaged Kelly’s future career opportunities as well as chilled the 
behavior of other (female) journalists. The incident was unusual for its degree 
of public salience, but illustrates the kind of measures a firm can take to 
prevent its customers from undermining the opportunities of its employees, 
as well as to contribute to positive anti-discrimination norms.123 
The proposed rule would also pressure businesses to rethink branding 
and advertising decisions that reinforce discriminatory customer preferences. 
 
Doing Enough, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/ 
2016/09/airbnb_needs_to_do_a_lot_more_to_fight_discrimination.html. 
 119.  This phenomenon may help to explain the rush by businesses to take actions designed to 
show disapproval of North Carolina’s House Bill 2 which, among other things, prohibits cities and 
counties from passing laws protecting their citizens from discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. See Yezmin Villarreal, Here’s All the Business N.C. Has Lost Because of Anti-LGBT Bill, 
ADVOCATE (Apr. 13, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2016/4/13/heres-all-
business-nc-has-lost-because-anti-lgbt-bill.  
 120.  See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a 
nursing home had created a hostile environment for a black nurse when it excluded that nurse 
from the rooms of residents who objected to being treated by black nurses). 
 121.  See Nick Duffy, Accommodation Website Airbnb Removes Listing That Banned Gay Couples, 
PINKNEWS (Nov. 23, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/11/23/accomodation 
-website-airbnb-removes-listing-that-banned-gay-couples (following outrage over a listing that 
banned couples from Airbnb website, Airbnb pulled the listing); see also Emaneulla Grinberg, 
When It Comes to Dating Sites, Race Matters, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:32 AM), http://www.cnn. 
com/2016/01/13/living/where-white-people-meet-feat (discussing how a billboard company 
pulled a billboard for WhereWhitePeopleMeet.Com after public protest). 
 122.  See Maggie Haberman & Nick Corasaniti, Donald Trump, in Feud with Fox News, Shuns Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/us/politics/trump-feud-fox-
debate.html. 
 123.  This example illustrates how the norm has changed over time. In a well-publicized 1983 
case, a local television station anchorwoman, Christine Craft, was moved to an off-camera position 
because she apparently lost her good looks as she aged. The network successfully defended a Title 
VII case, in part, because of focus group research showing that Craft’s appearance had an adverse 
impact on her acceptance among viewers. See generally Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 
868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), rev’d in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). For a first-hand account, see 
generally CHRISTINE CRAFT, TOO OLD, TOO UGLY, AND NOT DEFERENTIAL TO MEN (1988).  
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This includes advertisements that encourage customers to think of women as 
sex objects, or as less competent than men. Under the proposal, a sports 
franchise should rethink a name, or mascot, that disrespects women or 
minorities; it should refuse, for example, to allow its fans to attend games in 
“redface”124 or other garb that, while appealing to customer biases, shames or 
humiliates members of a historically disadvantaged minority. 
Not all available measures would necessarily be required by every firm, 
even in the case of discrimination by customers that falls into the least 
acceptable category. The proposed rule would only require firms to take 
reasonable steps calculated to end the harmful effects of discrimination by its 
customers. Yet, while firms have some discretion, there are some business 
practices that will be plainly prohibited by the proposed rule. For example, 
the proposed rule would make plain that firms cannot have hiring policies 
that assume that members of the public prefer to deal with people of their 
own race. Because of the direct impact of these policies on employees, some 
courts have interpreted existing employment discrimination law to outlaw 
them. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, for example, that a black 
woman who was let go by a telephone marketing company stated a prima facie 
case of race discrimination under section 1981 based on the company’s 
practice of “race-matching” black callers and black scripts with phone 
numbers in black calling areas and white callers and scripts with white calling 
areas.125 In another case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
summary judgment against a black employee suing for race discrimination 
based, among other things, on the fact that the employer assigned black 
salespersons to deal primarily with black accounts and white salespersons to 
serve white accounts.126 The proposed rule makes these practices more clearly 
illegal. 
Another practice that presumptively violates the proposed rule is reliance 
on evaluation tools through which biased customers are able to influence the 
employment prospects of women and minorities. Customer evaluations are 
notoriously biased along race and gender lines.127 Teacher evaluations by 
students, likewise, have been shown to reflect significant biases against women 
and minorities.128 Under this proposal, firms and educational institutions 
should not rely on these evaluations unless they find a way to negate that 
bias.129 
 
 124.  See Washington Redskins Fan Goes Full Red-Skinned, TMZ SPORTS (Sept. 25, 2015, 6:51 
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2015/09/25/washington-redskins-fan-full-redface-giants-game. 
 125.  See generally Ferrill v. The Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11th Cir. 1999).  
 126.  See generally Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999).  
    127.      See supra notes 8–9, 29 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 129.  For some suggestions, see Meera E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle: Fighting Bias in Teaching 
Evaluations, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 7, 39–41 (2015). 
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As for discrimination by customers that should be discouraged but not 
necessarily banned, some of the best strategies will allow the firm to impose 
the cost of that discrimination on the customers themselves. The model would 
be: (1) alcohol and tobacco taxes, by which society discourages socially 
undesirable behaviors by shifting the negative externalities of those behaviors 
to those engaged in them; and (2) managed care health plans, in which 
participants have to pay more to see, say, an out-of-network doctor than one 
covered by the plan. Again, the proposed rule would not necessarily require 
all firms to institute the same policies, but where customer bias affects the 
opportunities of its employees, it would obligate companies to find ways to 
reduce or eliminate that harm. Uber, for example, might assess a fee on 
customers who systematically reject dark-skinned drivers with foreign-
sounding names. If it did this, the proceeds could be redirected toward the 
population of drivers negatively affected by such systematic rejections. Other 
approaches might be appropriate where customer preferences would 
otherwise impose costs on other customers. Airlines asked to accommodate 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish men whose religious beliefs forbid them from sitting 
next to a woman on an airplane,130 for example, could place the costs of those 
accommodations on the men themselves rather than on female passengers, 
by requiring the male passenger to make prior arrangements or even to buy 
an extra (empty) seat.131 
Another structural approach is for firms to bundle certain goods and 
services to reduce the harmful effect of discriminatory customer preferences. 
One example is tip-pooling in the restaurant business. Tip-pooling levels out 
the discriminatory effects of race and gender bias in tipping by spreading 
those effects across all servers. As a result, no one set of servers, defined by 
race or gender, is disproportionately harmed by customer bias. Under the 
proposed rule, a restaurant would have an obligation to review a tipping policy 
that easily lent itself to race or gender discrimination and, unless it discovered 
that no such discrimination existed in its own establishment, move to a system 
like tip-pooling that mitigated the discriminatory consequences. 
Customers tend to become accustomed, and adapt, to the structure of a 
market. To take a simple example, law students accept the fact that the 
professors of the classes to which they are assigned in their required 1L classes 
represent, usually, a demographic cross-section of the available professors. 
 
 130.  See Antonia Blumberg, Ultra-Orthodox Men Cause Flight Delay by Refusing to Sit by Women, 
Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
12/29/orthodox-jewish-men-flight-delay_n_6391104.html; Isabel Kershner, She Was Asked to 
Switch Seats. Now She’s Charging El Al with Sexism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/27/world/middleeast/woman-81-to-sue-israeli-airline-over-
seat-switch.html.  
 131.  On the general matter of why religious accommodations should not always trump civil 
rights claims, or be cost-free, see generally Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable 
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 463 (2015). 
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Few students object to what is, in effect, the bundling that occurs, even though 
it reduces their choices. Similarly, clients typically accept the diverse work 
teams that firms establish to provide professional services; in addition to its 
other advantages,132 this bundling practice both makes it more difficult for 
clients to discriminate, and creates the working relationships in which 
prejudice may be reduced.133 
Pushing this strategy into less familiar territory, colleges and universities 
might do well to bundle tickets for men’s and women’s sports teams. Many 
colleges and universities already prop up the market for their less popular 
sporting events (say, non-conference games) by bundling tickets to those 
events with tickets that are more highly sought after (conference games). In 
the professional world of sports, such as the U.S. Open and other professional 
tennis events, tickets to men’s and women’s events have been bundled for 
decades.134 Bundling tickets for men’s and women’s college team 
competitions would not require fans to attend games they do not wish to 
attend. It would, however, even out opportunities for women and men in 
sports, allocate the costs of equalizing men’s and women’s sports to those with 
discriminatory preferences, and, as would appear to have been the case in 
professional tennis, induce some fans to develop a taste for women’s sports. 
There are undoubtedly other strategies that firms and establishments of 
public accommodation could use to discourage discrimination by their 
customers, situate the cost of that discrimination on those engaged in it, or 
spread that cost more evenly across society. As companies with customers who 
make choices reflecting race or gender bias are required to answer for their 
role in this bias, the proposed rule will encourage the development of such 
strategies. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
The direct, measurable effects of the proposed rule, admittedly, are not 
likely to be large. While some changes in a firm’s practices will be compelled 
by the proposed rule, the rule allows firms to choose among reasonable 
measures to reduce discrimination by customers. Perhaps the biggest gap in 
the proposed rule is that it will have no effect on businesses that customers 
avoid because of race or gender bias against the business. To address this 
problem would require a direct ban on customer behavior that, for all the 
reasons given in this article,135 would likely be impractical and ill-advised. 
 
  133.   For a description of these advantages, particularly with respect to discriminatory 
attitudes by employees, see Bartlett, supra note 24, at 1960–71.  
 134.  See generally ESTLUND, supra note 24.  
 135.  In the world of cricket, tickets for men’s and women’s games are also bundled. See 
Supriya Nair, Women’s Cricket Scores a Resounding Win in India, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2006), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1eaa43b0-f75a-11e5-96db-fc683b5e52db.html.  
 136.  See Part IV.A. 
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Despite these limitations, the proposed rule requires firms to do 
something meaningful to ensure that the bias of their customers does not 
disadvantage some employees. The measures chosen should make 
discrimination more difficult or allocate its costs more fairly. Just as 
importantly, these measures can have a positive influence on societal norms. 
Research suggests that the normative information conveyed by the law and 
responses to it can be important in enabling individuals in society to 
coordinate their actions around socially beneficial actions.136 The fact that a 
robust norm against discrimination has been built up over a half century in 
the contexts of employment and public accommodations may make the task 
of extending that norm to individual customers easier. There can be little 
doubt that anti-discrimination laws have had a significant impact on 
workplace fairness and in access to public accommodations, despite the fact 
that plaintiffs in discrimination cases are more likely to lose their lawsuits than 
plaintiffs in any other category of civil litigation.137 The law prohibiting race 
and sex discrimination in choosing a jury138 is almost impossible to enforce,139 
and yet the law marks the underlying discriminatory behavior as wrong, in 
part to signal society’s disapproval of discrimination and to build social norms 
accordingly.140 The proposed rule has the potential to make this same kind of 
 
 137.  See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
LIMITS (2015) (describing the conditions that strengthen the expressive powers of law); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (exploring the role of law 
in changing and reinforcing social norms). Among the research, studies show injunctive 
normative information can suppress negative social norms. See generally Robert B. Cialdini, 
Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 CURRENT DIRECTION IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 105 
(2003); Robert B. Cialdini et al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SOC. INFLUENCE 3 
(2006). In the work discrimination context, see Grant & Sandberg, supra note 104. 
 138.  Among all categories of civil litigation, discrimination cases are the hardest to win. 
Plaintiffs in discrimination cases do worse than defendants at every stage of litigation—
settlements, pre-trial motions, trials, and appeals. See generally  Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 103 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004). 
 139.  See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that the state 
may not exercise its peremptory challenges on the basis of sex); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986) (holding that the state may not exercise its peremptory challenges based on race); 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding it 
unconstitutional for a party to use peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation).  
 140.  The exceptions involve blatant circumstances involving the complete elimination of 
prospective jurors based on race. See generally Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (in a 
capital case, prosecutors highlighted each black prospective juror to indicate that the juror was 
black, ranked each black prospective juror against each other, and struck each black candidate 
from the jury pool). 
 141.  As another example, some countries are considering bans on smoking in cars with children 
present. There is little chance of effectively enforcing such laws, but their advocates believe they would 
educate the public about the health risks of smoking and help change social norms about the 
acceptability of smoking around children. See Neil Thorpe, Smoking Ban in Cars with Children Difficult to 
E1_BARLETT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  6:00 PM 
2016] DISCRIMINATION BY CUSTOMERS 257 
contribution to anti-discrimination norms. The state can help reinforce these 
same norms through public service campaigns attacking discrimination with 
the same vigor it has used to attack smoking, littering, and drugs. 
Once discrimination by customers is fully understood in relation to the 
firm behavior with which it is entwined, it no longer seems possible to view it 
as entirely outside the law’s concern. Customer discrimination harms some 
people in the same way as discrimination by firms, if fewer at a time. There is 
at present no law that tells customers, or the businesses they patronize, that 
customer discrimination is wrong. The proposed rule would change this. It 
would recognize the harm of discrimination by customers and adopt a norm 
against it. It would impose an obligation on firms that takes account of the 
concerns that make regulation in this area such a sensitive matter, and of the 
different contexts that makes some forms of discrimination by customers 
more important to stop than others. 
The proposed rule may seem, at once, both too incremental and too 
extreme. This is to be expected. Every extension of anti-discrimination law 
takes some getting used to, but we have tried to be realistic in terms of what 
might be politically feasible and actually work. The proposed rule is designed 
to stimulate imaginative thinking about the problem of customer 
discrimination. In the course of time, the solutions that firms are able to frame 
will become as second nature as other measures we have come to count on to 




Enforce, CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:53 AM), http://theconversation.com/smoking-ban-in-cars-
with-children-difficult-to-enforce-22960.  
